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Experts appear able to handle much larger amounts of specialized information 
than nonexperts, and handle it without an apparent superior memory capacity. 
This finding, based on research on chess players with chess information, was 
replicated on Go players with Go information. Assuming this superiority occurs 
because the experts process chunks of information through their limited capac- 
ities rather than individual elements, the question then becomes one of de- 
fining what the chunks are and how they are related. To this end, the 
technique of partitioning recall and reproduction data into chunks on the basis 
of inter-response times (IRTs) (introduced in their work on chess by Chase and 
Simon, 1973) was applied to the reproduction and recall of Go patterns by a 
Go Master and a Go beginner. Unlike its application in chess, no single IRT 
was able to produce consistent, veridical chunks for either Go player. Sub- 
sequent analysis of the underlying assumptions of the technique showed it to 
be limited to only those patterns that can be partitioned into a linear set 
of chunks, not nested chunks, and to situations in which retrieval and overt 
recall of each chunk is completed before retrieval of the next chunk. In a 
supplementary task, the Master Go player indicated that the Go patterns were 
not seen as linear chunks nor as strictly nested hierarchies, but rather as over- 
lapping clusters. IRTs were found to be correlated with this structure, but were 
not reliable enough to reflect its details. 
Experts differ from nonexperts more in perceptual-memorial abilities 
than in logical, problem solving abilities normally thought characteristic 
of thinking. There is something about the expert’s accrued past exper- 
ience and the similarity of the current situation to that experience that 
allows him to reduce masses of specialized information, without con- 
comitant loss of detail, into units his limited capacity can handle. The 
expert seems to be built the same as the nonexpert and have the same 
mechanisms available to him; he is just better at moving information 
through his system. 
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Such a characterization of the skilled thinker is based primarily on the 
research of de Groot (1966), Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b), and 
Charness (1974), in their explorations of the skilled thinking involved in 
playing chess. de Groot, for example, found that the depth and breadth 
of the Master chess player’s search in his potential-move tree is equivalent 
to that of the beginner; the Master explores only good moves, the be- 
ginner explores some bad. Also, the basic abilities to reproduce patterns 
appear to be equal for the two players when the material tested is non- 
meaningful patterns of chess pieces. The Master shows remarkable re- 
call, however, when tested on real chess game positions, nearly twice 
as good as that of the beginner. 
The question then arises as to what the skilled thinker sees and re- 
members. What are the structures he notes in the stimulus configuration 
that then trigger the appropriate actions? The expert’s recall superiority 
without a capacity superiority or a loss of detail suggests that he pro- 
cesses familiar subpatterns of information, called chunks, rather than in- 
dividual elements. The question then becomes one of defining what the 
contents of these chunks are and how they are organized. 
What behavioral correlates indicate the structure seen and remembered 
by a skilled thinker? Previous concerns with clustering in memory have 
resulted in measures of organization too specialized to be of help in this 
situation. For example, measures of subjective organization (Tulving, 
1%2; Mandler, 1967) are little more than numbers reflecting the con- 
sistency with which a set of elements is recalled contiguously, reflecting 
the amount of existing structure rather than its form. Similarly, the tran- 
sition error probability measure, which defines substructure boundaries as 
those points in serial recall at which error rates are high (Bower & 
Winzenz, 1969; Martin & Noreen, 1974), applies only to material that 
must be recalled in a designated serial order and that is not as yet well 
learned. 
As a behavioral correlate of structure, the timing characteristics of re- 
call appear to be more applicable to the kinds of well-learned patterns 
found in chess. When elements to be learned are preorganized into chunks 
and elements of a chunk are retrieved together before being overtly re- 
called, subjects can be expected to recall elements in bursts, pausing 
between bursts. Because pauses have been shown to fall at the boundaries 
of experimenter-defined chunks, (Bower & Springston, 1970; McLean & 
Gregg, 1967; Gelfand, 1971), pauses can be used to discover unknown 
chunks. 
Pauses in recall were adopted by Chase and Simon (1973a) as indicators 
of the boundaries of the chunks skilled chess players see in the material 
they perceive and recall. Chase and Simon partitioned the recall of a 
chess Master, a Class A player, and a beginner into chunks on the 
basis of a single inter-response time (IRT). Those elements that were 
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recalled in less than a fixed amount of elapsed time since the last element 
were considered members of the same chunk, those that required more 
were considered arising from two successive chunks. 
Chase and Simon’s results showed that although the contents of the 
chunks of the players of different skill levels were similar, the Master’s 
chunks were larger overall, and he recalled more of them after a short 
study time than the beginner. Because he and the beginner were shown 
to have the same abilities when trying to recall scrambled chessboards 
(confirming de Groot’s earlier finding), Chase and Simon concluded that in 
order to remember more chunks than the beginner, the Master must have 
chunks hierarchically organized, one chunk label serving for recall of 
two or more subchunks. 
The purpose of the present work was to examine in detail the tech- 
nique of partitioning recall on the basis of IRTs by replicating the work 
of Chase and Simon on material similar but not identical to chess; namely, 
the game of Go. In the procedure adopted by Chase and Simon, the sub- 
ject experienced two tasks, a Perception task, from which the contents 
of and recall characteristics from chunks are inferred, and a short-term 
recall task, called the Memory task, which produces the data to be 
chunked. In both tasks, the subject attempted to reproduce a pattern. In 
the Perception task, he was allowed to look back at the stimulus pattern 
as many times as he wished. It was assumed that at each glance back to 
the stimulus pattern, he perceived and coded one chunk, then turned to 
the response board and placed on it that chunk’s constituent elements. 
In the Memory task, he tried to recall the entire board pattern after 
5 set of study time. 
First, assuming in the Perception task that successive glances bound 
chunks, Chase and Simon looked at the distribution of IRTs that re- 
flected the recall of elements within chunks and those that reflected the 
crossing of chunk boundaries. Second, a single IRT was chosen, one that 
separated the two distributions, as a criteria1 IRT, below which succes- 
sive recalls were to be considered from the same chunk, above which 
they were considered to cross chunk boundaries. The correspondence 
between elements within chunks defined by glances and those within 
chunks defined by IRTs lent support to the validity of this technique. 
Third, Chase and Simon compared the distributions of IRTs executed 
in the two tasks. The resultant general correspondence allowed the IRT 
partition value from the Perception task to be used in partitioning the 
Memory task data. As a last step in the validation, the contents of chunks 
in the Memory task were compared with those in the Perception task. 
Because they matched, conclusions were drawn about the sizes of chunks 
and the number of chunks recalled by the subjects in the Memory task, 
reflecting the differences between the Master’s and beginner’s perceptual 
structures. 
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Because of an apparent hierarchical nature of the pieces in Go board 
configurations, Go was thought to be the ideal source for patterns to be 
used in a replication and extension of the technique introduced by Chase 
and Simon. In Go, two players compete to surround maximum territory 
on a board, a 19 x 19 grid, with walls consisting of single pieces, called 
stones. (See Eisenstadt & Kareev, 1975.) Players move in turns, at each 
turn placing one stone on an unoccupied grid point. Isolated stones are 
incorporated into higher order units called strings. Two or more stones 
of the same color immediately adjacent to each other on a grid line con- 
stitute a string. Neighboring sets of friendly strings form a group, units 
of still higher order. It is these higher order units that constitute the 
walls that surround final territory. Go is thus a game of accretion rather 
than displacement. The amount of territorial control each player has at 
any time during the game is a function of the relative security of each 
player’s groups and the placement of the groups over the board. 
This paper describes an attempt to use IRTs to partition a Go Master’s 
and Go beginner’s recall of meaningful and nonmeaningful patterns of Go 
stones. A critique of the technique follows from the Master’s performance 
in an additional task and from an examination of the underlying assump- 
tions necessary for deducing structure from pauses. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Two subjects, a Go beginner and a Go Master, were videotaped while performing two 
tasks. At the time of the experiment, the Master player was estimated to have played 
over 7,000 games and was the best non-Oriental Go player in the world, ranked 4-dan.’ 
His goal is to become a professionally ranked Go player, and to that end he is currently 
apprenticed in the house of a Go Master in Japan, now ranked 6-dan, and is successfully 
competing in tournaments with Go professionals. At the time of the experiment, the be- 
ginner had played about 50 games and was assiduously reading introductory Go books and 
journals. He is the programmer associated with the research group currently producing an 
intelligent Go playing program (see Reitman & Wilcox, 1975; Reitman, Kerwin, Nado, 
Reitman, & Wilcox, 1974). 
Tasks 
The two tasks, called Memory and Perception, were close replications of those con- 
structed by Chase and Simon. In both tasks, the subject was to reproduce patterns of 
Go stones as quickly and as accurately as possible. On the subject’s left was a Go board 
with one of 28 patterns placed in the lower right quadrant. To the subject’s right was an 
empty Go board and a pile of black and white stones, more than enough of each kind to com- 
plete the pattern. In the Perception task, the stimulus pattern remained exposed through- 
’ Go players are ranked on a single ordinal scale ranging in increasing ability from 
3%kyu to 1-kyu to I-dan to 9-dan. Though progress through the high kyu rank is rapid, 
later increases in ranking are accompanied by much larger amounts of time playing against 
better players. 
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out the trial; the subject was allowed as many glances back to it as he thought necessary. 
In the Memory task, the stimulus pattern was exposed for only 5 set of study time, then 
was covered while the subject attempted to reproduce as much of that pattern as he could. 
If  he did not complete the entire pattern correctly on that trial, stones from the response 
board were removed, and the subject was allowed another 5 set of study on the stimulus 
pattern. The study-test sequence was repeated until the subject reproduced the entire 
pattern correctly. 
Materials 
The 28 stimulus patterns consisted of two sets of 14, one set for the Perception task. 
one for the Memory task. In each set, 10 patterns were portions of real Go games, four 
were nonmeaningful, random clusters of stones. Examples of meaningful and random pat- 
terns are shown in Fig. 1. The meaningful patterns, extracted from Masters’ games reported 
in Japanese Go journals, comprised the stones placed in any one quadrant of the board 
at a quiet point in the game. The nonmeaningful, random patterns were constructed by 
first determining the average cluster size of stones in a quadrant of real games, then as- 
signing black and white stones randomly to appropriate size clusters, then placing these 
clusters randomly in the quadrant. As a result, random patterns were as compact as real 
patterns (widely spaced stones being inherently more difficult to reproduce than connected 
ones), but consisted of only spuriously meaningful relations. Half of all the stimulus 
patterns consisted of 22-25 stones, half 12-15, corresponding to the numbers of pieces 
in the Middle and End chess game positions used by Chase and Simon. 
Supplementary Task 
Six months after the experiment was completed,’ the Go Master was given a third task. 
He was issued a set of paper transcriptions of the 20 real game positions used in the 
experiment and asked to indicate the partitioning he saw in each pattern. He was asked to 
circle the individual stones that were related, then, as appropriate, to indicate which groups 
of stones were related on a higher level. In response to these instructions, he circled some 
groups of stones on the stimulus patterns and made what he called a list of basic “unitary 
patterns [which he] perceived and remembered together as one thing [since they had been] 
illustrated so many times that the various stones phase into a single object.” 
Details of these circled patterns are described in the results as data with which to compare 
the partitioning based on IRTs from the Chase and Simon technique. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
From the videotapes of the subjects’ performances were recorded the 
tollowing data. Each stone placement was defined by a board location and 
a stone color, and associated with it was the time that elapsed since the 
last stone placement, called IRT. Notation was made when a stone place- 
ment was preceded by a glance to the stimulus board in the Perception 
task, and in both tasks whether this or the previous placement was made 
in error. 
IRTs were recorded by a single transcriber visually inspecting the video- 
tape, indicating each placement by pressing a reaction-time key input to a 
computer clock. To measure the reliability of the transcription procedure, 
IRTs from a sample of three trials were recorded once by each of two 
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FIG. 1. An example of meaningful (left panel) and random (right panel) patterns. 
transcribers. The data from one transcriber were compared point by point 
with that from the second transcriber. The average differences between 
these pairs of points was 45 msec; the average absolute difference was 
133 msec. Since most of the data points were on the order of 1 set or 
more, this variability was considered negligible. To measure the veridi- 
cality of the transcription, IRTs from another sample of three trials were 
additionally transcribed by counting frames of the videotape. The human 
interface procedure matched the IRTs from the frame counting to within 
100 msec, again considered negligible. 
In what follows, the analytical procedure used by Chase and Simon is 
traced with the addition of a critique of the procedure based on the 
Master’s performance on the supplementary task. Briefly, both players’ 
overall recall performance in the Memory task reconfirmed the Master’s 
superior recall skills for meaningful but not random patterns. Then, in 
an effort to describe this superior ability in terms of the numbers of chunks 
he can retain or the sizes of his stored chunks, a chunk boundary de- 
lineator was sought in the IRT data and its validation attempted. The 
validation procedure involved evaluation of the correspondence between 
two ways of partitioning the Perception task data into chunks (one which 
used IRTs and one which used the subject’s glances to the stimulus pat- 
tern), comparison of the general timing characteristics between the Per- 
ception and Memory tasks, a partitioning of the Memory task into chunks 
on the basis of IRTs, followed-by a correspondence check between the 
contents of chunks from the Memory and Perception tasks. 
Overall Retention Performance 
Figure 2 illustrates the fact that although the Master reproduced ran- 
dom patterns with the same ability as the beginner, on the meaningful 
patterns, he was far superior. On Trial 1, the beginner and the Master 
recalled about 25 and 30% of the stones in the random patterns, re- 
spectively. On the meaningful patterns, the Master recalled 66%, the 
beginner 39%, a significant difference, r(9) = 3.35, p < .Ol. The beginner 
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FIG. 2. Percentage recalled by the Master and beginner on successive trials in the Memory 
task for both random and meaningful patterns. 
and Master took on the average 3.75 and 4.25 trials, respectively, to 
reproduce random patterns; on meaningful patterns, the beginner took 
3.4 trials, the Master 2.5, nearly a full trial fewer, t(9) = 1.86, p < .05. 
Search for a Chunk Boundary Delineator in the IRTs of the Perception 
Task 
Whenever two IRT distributions were compared, the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov (K-S) two-sample test was applied, as described in Siegel (1956). 
In all applications of this test, frequency distributions were taken across 
100 msec intervals before being converted to cumulative distributions. 
Results of the applications of this test are reported with an indication of 
the K-S symbol, the largest difference called D, and the sample sizes. 
In the entire set of analyses involving IRTs, only those from errorless 
performance in meaningful patterns were considered appropriate data. Al- 
though the distribution of IRTs for errors in the Perception task was 
indistinguishable from that of the correct placements, IRTs were signif- 
icantly longer on the average in the Memory task, K-S: D(7890) 
= .34, p < .Ol. Also, since the purpose was to define the subjects’ struc- 
tural differences in meaningful patterns, data from meaningful patterns 
were those upon which the partitioning criteria were validated. 
ZR Ts in the Perception tusk. The Perception task presumably required 
the subject to code and retain a chunk each time he looked at the stim- 
ulus pattern. Then after he turned to the response board, he placed on 






FIG. 3. IRT distributions within and between glance-chunks by beginners and Masters 
of Go and chess. 
the board the stones that constituted the chunk.2 The left-hand panels 
of Figure 3 illustrate the distributions of IRTs that occurred between 
stone placements that involved a glance back to the pattern (hereafter 
referred to as “between chunks”) and those that occurred without such 
a glance back to the pattern (called “within chunks”). The right-hand 
panels illustrate the corresponding distributions for the beginner and the 
Master chess players from the work of Chase and Simon. 
For both Go and chess players, IRTs within a chunk are distinguish- 
ably shorter than those between chunks, Go beginner K-S: 0(99,47) 
= .67; Go Master K-S: 0(120,42) = .49, p < .Ol. The Master players 
from both games were quicker than the beginners in perceiving the next 
chunk; the Go Master’s IRTs between chunks appear shorter than the 
beginner’s, although significant at only the. lOlevel, K-S: 0(42,47) = .26. 
The overall timing characteristics were similar for chess and Go ex- 
cept that the IRTs between chunks look somewhat shorter for the Go 
players than the chess players. Explanation for this probably rests in the 
kinds of pieces the players have to pick up and place, something they do 
while glancing. In Go, the pieces are identical except for color; in chess 
they are different in both color and shape. Picking up the right kinds of 
2 Inspection of the Master’s circled subpatterns, described later, lends support to the 
notion that subjects in this task do, in general, perceive and place one chunk at a time. 
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pieces for the next chunk undoubtedly takes longer for chess than it does 
for Go. 
The Go and chess Masters’ within- and between-chunk IRT distribu- 
tions overlapped considerably, more than those of the beginners. For the 
Go Master, 49% of the within-chunk IRTs overlapped with the between- 
chunk IRTs; for the chess Master, 58%. The Go and chess beginners’ 
distributions overlapped 45 and 34%, respectively. This overlap is critical 
to the delineation of chunk boundaries, for it determines the minimum 
amount of error a single criteria1 IRT will produce. If the criteria1 IRT 
is set at a point at which the numbers of the two kinds of errors are 
equal, for the Master Go player 21% of the delineated chunk boundaries 
will be in error. Either stones which are actually part of the previous 
chunk will be considered spanning chunk boundaries, or the actual be- 
ginning of the next chunk will be considered as an extension of the previous 
chunk. Because of these large overlaps in the IRT distributions, the upper 
limit of the accuracy that a single IRT may have in partitioning the 
Master’s data is severely reduced. 
Contents of chunks in the Perception task. Adoption of the Chase and 
Simon technique for delineating chunk boundaries on the basis of a single 
IRT requires validation. Contents of the chunks delineated by IRTs need 
to be compared with contents of true chunks. Following Chase and 
Simon, the partitioning provided by glances to the stimulus pattern in the 
Perception task was assumed to reflect true chunk boundaries. The cor- 
respondence between some salient features of these “true” chunks, called 
glance-chunks, and of the ones created by the IRT partition, called 
IRT-chunks, was tested. 
Stones from within a single chunk could be expected to have one 
distribution of relationships, and stones that span chunk boundaries to 
have a different distribution. For example, the stones within chunks 
are likely to be the same color, forming portions of defense walls or 
attacking configurations. Similarly, many of the within-chunk stones could 
be expected to be placed next to each other. Fewer of the between- 
chunk placements may be expected to be so close; they are more likely 
to be farther away. Accordingly, in examining the contents of a chunk, 
five spatial relationships between pairs of successively placed stones were 
defined and the identity of color between successive stones was noted. 
The five spatial relationships, illustrated in Fig. 4, were: Next, Diagonal 
Skip one or two points, Skip one or two on an adjacent axis (similar to 
knights’ moves in chess), and Other. 
Whenever in the analyses the kinds of relationships among stones that 
occurred in one sample were compared with those of another sample, the 
maximum likelihood estimate chi-square test was used (see Hayes, 1963). 
In describing where in significantly different distributions the primary 
differences occurred, md was used as an indicator of the relative 
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Nexi 
Diagonal 
Skip 1 or 
Other 
FIG. 4. Exemplars of the five spatial relationships between successively placed pieces 
and the board territory around a single piece covered by all possible exemplars of these 
relationships. 
magnitudes of the differences (see Haberman, 1973). The fi$ indicator, 
calculated from collapsed 2 x 2 tables from an original R x C table, 
approximates the normal deviate, and consequently was of interest (using 
(Y = .05) when its value exceeded 1.96 in either direction. 
Table 1 lists the relationships that existed between successively placed 
stones both within and between glance-chunks for both subjects. For both 
the Master and beginner, the distributions of relationships within chunks 
were significantly different from those between chunks, beginner’s 
x2(4) = 30.63; Master’s x2(4) = 11.08,~ < .Ol. Within chunks, stones were 
more likely to be placed next to each other, beginner’s fi+ = +3.03, 
Master’s fi4 = +2.46; those between chunks were likely to be some 
“Other” relationship, beginner’s fi+ = +5.35; Master’s X&J+ 
= +2.96. Similarly, both the beginner and the Master placed more stones 
of the same color within a chunk than they did between chunks, be- 
ginner’s fi+ = +3.38; Master’s V’@ = +3.06. 
Once the distributions of color and spatial relationships that existed 
within and between glance-chunks were established, the same data were 
partitioned according to a single IRT criterion and tested: (1) for the 
same pattern of differences within and between chunks in color and spatial 
relationships as found in the glance-chunks, (2) for similarity of the color 
and spatial relationships within IRT-chunks and within glance-chunks, 
and (3) similarity of the relationships that existed between IRT-chunks 
and between glance-chunks. Each of these steps required one test for the 
color relationship, a 2 x 2 chi-square, and one for the spatial relationships, 
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TABLE 1 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVELY PLACED PIECES WITHIN AND 
BETWEEN GLANCE-CHUNKS IN THE PERCEPTION TASK FOR 
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56 (57) I4 (30) 57 (48) II (26) 
I6 (16) 7 (15) 24 (20) 7 (17) 
I3 (13) 7 (15) 13 (I I) 6 (14) 
I3 (13) 5 (10) I6 (13) 7 (171 
I (I) I4 (30) IO (8) I I (26) 
99 47 120 42 
a 2 x 5 chi-square. If according to this procedure, the IRT partition did 
not produce the desired set of similarities and differences, the value of the 
criteria1 IRT was changed and the resulting IRT-chunks tested again. 
The first criteria1 IRT evaluated was 2 set, the one Chase and Simon 
found acceptable for their chess players. Successive placements that re- 
quired less than 2 set were assumed to be within a chunk, those that 
required more were assumed to cross chunk boundaries. For the beginner, 
chunks defined by the 2 set IRT seemed to contain the same kinds of 
relationships as glance-chunks. He placed more stones of the same color 
within IRT-chunks than between, x2(4) = 48.61,~ < .Ol. And, the color 
and spatial relationships of placements within glance-chunks matched 
those within IRT-chunks, color: x2(1) = 0.09, relations: x2(4) = 1.40, p 
> .lO, and those between glance-chunks matched those between IRT- 
chunks, color: x2( 1) = 1.26, relations: x2(4) = 4.56,~ > . 10. The 2 set IRT 
boundary misclassified only 10% of the within glance-chunk placements 
and 39% of the between glance-chunk placements. 
Although acceptable for the beginner, the 2 set criterion did not parti- 
tion the Master’s data well. Although the 2 set boundary misclassified 
only 10% of the within glance-chunk placements, it misclassified 60% of 
the between glance-chunk placements (see Fig. 3). And, although accord- 
ing to most tests the contents of the glance- and IRT-chunks corresponded, 
the IRT-chunks did not have significantly more same-color stone place- 
ments within a chunk than between chunks, as glance-chunks did, x2(1) 
= 3.09, p > . 10. The distributions of IRTs suggested that if there was a 
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single IRT that separated glance-chunks appropriately, it was at a shorter 
IRT value. 
For the Master’s data, then, the value of the criteria1 IRT was re- 
duced in increments of 100 msec until the contents of the IRT-chunks 
matched that of the glance-chunks. The longest such IRT was 1.3 sec. 
Chunks partitioned at 1.3 set contained significantly more stones of the 
same color within IRT-chunks than between, and the pattern of spatial 
relationships within IRT-chunks was distinct from that between chunks, 
color: x2(1) = 4.82, relationships: x2(4) = 18.41 ,p < .Ol. The distribution 
of color and spatial relationships within IRT-chunks matched those 
within glance-chunks, color: x2(1) = 0.00; relationships: x2(4) = 1.77, 
p > .lO; and those between IRT-chunks matched those between glance- 
chunks, color: x2(1) = 0.88; relationships: x2(4) = 0.65, p > .lO. At this 
value, the two kinds of misclassification errors were most evenly divided; 
34% of the within glance-chunk placements were misclassified as be- 
tween IRT-chunks, and 30% of those between glance-chunks were 
misclassified as within IRT-chunks. 
General correspondence between Memory and Perception tasks. After 
criteria1 IRTs were assigned in the Perception task, the correspondence 
between the Perception and Memory tasks was assessed. The result of 
finding these tasks indistinguishable allowed the criteria1 IRT to be used 
to partition the Memory task data into chunks. 
The Memory task involved scanning the stimulus board for 5 set, coding 
chunks of it, and retaining their codes or labels. In responding, the sub- 
ject presumably took the next code, found its constituent elements in 
memory, and placed designated stones appropriately on the board. In the 
Perception task, the subject looked at the stimulus pattern, perceived 
and coded a single chunk, turned his head to the response board and 
placed stones appropriately. Implicit in the application of the IRT that 
was validated in the Perception task to the Memory task are the assump- 
tions that (i) because both tasks involve an identical operation, that of 
placing on the board stones from within the same coded chunk, the times 
to execute these moves should be the same in both tasks, and (ii) the 
operations that are different in the two tasks, turning the head, perceiving 
and coding the next chunk versus getting a code and finding its con- 
stituent parts, require similar if not identical times. 
Theoretically, confirmation of only the first assumption was of interest. 
However, because there was no appropriate definable subportion of the 
Memory task data, confirmation of both assumptions was attempted si- 
multaneously. A match of the single distribution of IRTs in the Memory 
task to the combination of the within and between glance-chunk distribu- 
tions in the Perception task was accepted as support for both assump- 
tions. Figure 5 illustrates the Memory and Perception task IRT distribu- 
tions for the two subjects. For both the beginner and the Master, the 
















j1 . Memory, trial 1 
IRTs in seconds 
FIG. 5. IRT distributions from the first trial of the Memory task superimposed on the 
combined within and between glance-chunks distributions from the Perception task for both 
subjects. 
distributions were statistically indistinguishable, beginner K-S: 0(148,54) 
= .17; Master K-S: 0(162,89) = .ll,p > .lO. 
Comparing the contents of Memory task IR T-chunks with that of Per- 
ception task glance-chunks. As the last validation step, the contents of the 
chunks partitioned with IRTs in the Memory task were compared with 
the contents of the glance-chunks in the Perception task. Table 2 lists 
the distributions of color and spatial relationships that existed within and 
between IRT-chunks in Trial 1 of the Memory task. Comparable Percep- 
tion task data are in Table 1. The IRT used to partition the beginner’s 
data was 2 set, that for the Master was 1.3. 
In the first trial of the Memory task, the beginner made only five re- 
sponses that required longer than 2 sec. Assuming he did not change 
strategies drastically, this would indicate that on the initial 5 set exposure 
to each pattern, he remembered only slightly more than one chunk. The 
distribution of relationships involving these five moves was not amenable 
to statistical comparisons. The kinds of relationships occurring within 
IRT-chunks, however, could be and were statistically compared with 
those within glance-chunks. As desired, the distributions of color similar- 
ities were identical. However, those involving spatial relationships were 
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TABLE 2 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVELY PLACED PIECES WITHIN AND BETWEEN 
IRT-CHUNKS IN THE FIRST TRIAL OF THE MEMORY TASK FOR 
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Note. The criteria1 IRT for the beginner is 2 sec. that for the Master is 1.3 sec. 
significantly different, x2(4) = 10.68, p < .05. Within IRT-chunks in the 
Memory task, the beginner placed significantly fewer diagonally related 
stones, ~%4 = -2.08, and significantly more “Others,” fi~$ = +2.30 
than within glance-chunks in the Perception task. The chunks were not 
the same. 
For the Master, the single IRT at 1.3 set was similarly unsuitable. 
The distribution of spatial relationships within IRT-chunks was not differ- 
entfrom that between IRT-chunks, x2(4) = 6.22,~ > .lO. Whereas stones 
placed within glance-chunks in the Perception task had significantly more 
“Next” and fewer “Other” relationships, in the Memory task there were 
only small, nonsignificant deviations in these same directions, v’?@ 
= + 1.39 and - .96 for “Next” and “Other,” respectively. 
Perhaps the failure of a single IRT to partition the Memory task data 
into chunks that match those in the Perception task was due to the selec- 
tion of the wrong IRT values. There may have been other IRTs that par- 
titioned the Perception task as well as the 2 and 1.3 set criteria, yet 
also partitioned the Memory data into chunks with comparable contents. 
In search of an acceptable IRT, data from both tasks were partitioned 
into IRT-chunks using 10 different IRT values, all those between 1 and 2 
set at 100 msec intervals, and subjected to the same kinds of content 
analyses as described above. Although for both subjects, many IRT val- 
ues partitioned the Perception data such that the contents of the IRT- 
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chunks matched that of the glance chunks, no IRT partitioned the Memory 
task data so that Memory IRT-chunks matched glance-chunks. It ap- 
peared, then, that either the two tasks evoked different strategies that 
resulted in different partitionings or IRTs did not appropriately reflect 
perceived structure. 
That the Master was quick to both perceive the next chunk and to pick 
up the appropriate response pieces, resulting in the overlap of the between 
glance-chunk and within glance-chunk IRT distributions, does not seem to 
be sufficient cause for rejecting this technique for partitioning the data. 
A single IRT partitioned the Perception task data well. There were enough 
differences between the moves made in a short time and those requiring 
a long time that the errors of misclassification did not alter the match 
between glance-chunks and IRT-chunks within the Perception task. Dif- 
ficulty came only when the contents of the chunks from the Perception 
task were compared with those of the Memory task. 
Master’s Penciled Partitions 
Results from the Master’s third task, however, suggested a reason why 
the technique of partitioning chunks with a single IRT failed. In the 
third task, the Master was given paper transcriptions of the real board 
stimuli from the Perception and Memory tasks and asked to indicate with 
penciled circles the partitioning he saw on these patterns. He was expected 
to circle small subpatterns, then enclose them in higher level patterns, in- 
dicating how these groups of stones function together on several levels. 
The left panel of Fig. 6 illustrates examples of his responses to these 
instructions. He did not partition these patterns in a strictly nested 
hierarchy, as expected, but rather circled overlapping subpatterns, some 
elements of which were entirely enclosed in higher level patterns, some 
of which were members of two or more chunks. In addition, the Master 
commented that there was yet another partition of the patterns, that of 
successive overlapping pairs of stones that reflect the order of actual 
play of the game, each pair being a move and the opponent’s standard 
reply. 
This penciled partitioning, taken as veridical, can aid in assessing the 
reason IRTs failed to partition the Perception and Memory tasks into 
equivalent chunks. As mentioned above, one possible reason they failed 
is that the chunks seen in the two tasks were different, that the two tasks 
evoked different partitions. Evidence for this conjecture appears through 
examination of the correspondence between the penciled chunks bounda- 
ries, the glances in the Perception task, and the kind of recall in the 
first trial of the Memory task. If the glances occurred at penciled chunk 
boundaries and recall consisted primarily of complete penciled chunks 
then there is little to suggest that the tasks evoked different partitions. 
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FIG. 6. Examples of the Go Master’s penciled partitioning of meaningful patterns and 
the orders in which he recalled the elements. 
Table 3 shows the relationships between the occurrence of glances in 
the Perception task and the crossing of penciled chunk boundaries. Of 
the 61 successive placements that crossed penciled chunk boundaries, 33 
were accompanied with glances back to the stimulus board; of the 116 
placements within a penciled chunk, 96 lacked a glance to the board. 
Glances appeared appropriately in 78% of the placements. Furthermore, 
within the 28 cross-boundary placements that were not accompanied with 
a glance and the 20 glances occurring at places other than penciled 
boundaries, 14 were within one placement of a glance, either early or 
late, and six occurred at the point of overlap between penciled chunks. 
In the cases where the glances were one move off, it is reasonable 
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TABLE 3 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE OCCURRENCE OF GLANCES AND 
THE CROSSING OF PENCILED CHUNK BOUNDAMES 
Partition boundary crossed 









53 124 177 
to assume that the Master, in being late, initiated the beginning of the 
next chunk before glancing to the stimulus board, or in being early, 
glanced while knowing the completion of the preceding chunk. If these 20 
almost right responses are included as correct, a total of 84% of the 
successive placements concur with the glances. 
In the first trial of the Memory task, the Master placed at least one 
stone in each of the 53 distinct penciled chunks, 44 of which were re- 
called completely (83%). Similarly, of the 115 stones correctly placed, 
90% of them were accompanied by all their chunk-mates. It appears 
that the Master primarily recalled whole chunks, as Tulving and Pearl- 
stone (1966) found, and that the chunks were the same as those indicated 
in the penciled partitions. 
The fact that the penciled partitioning of the patterns in the Perception 
and Memory tasks correspond to behavior in both tasks, i.e., glances 
occur at chunk boundaries and recall consists of whole chunks, suggests 
that the tasks did not force the Master to partition the patterns differently. 
It appears then that the mismatch in the chunks delineated by IRTs 
in the Perception and Memory tasks is not the consequence of differing 
partitions evoked by the tasks, but rather something more fundamental 
about IRTs. Suppose it were true that IRTs within chunks were con- 
sistently shorter than those between chunks. In the overlapping chunk 
structure the Master drew, it is not clear what the pattern of IRTs would 
be. For example, in Fig. 6A, when the Master placed stone 6 then 7, he 
clearly crossed a chunk boundary; his IRT could be expected to be long. 
However, in placing stones 1 and 2, he keeps within the first chunk, 
but simultaneously enters the second chunk (consisting of stones 2,3, and 
4). The placement is both within and between chunks. Are IRTs expected 
to be long or short? 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the actual IRTs obtained and 
four definable kinds of successive placements: (1) those clearly within a 
chunk, (2) those clearly between chunks, (3) those between low-level 
chunks but nested within a higher level chunk, and (4) those at points at 
which two chunks overlap. It appears that placements that clearly cross 
PERCEPTION IN GO 353 
40 
t y fhin Chunks 
FIG. 7. IRT distributions within and between penciled chunks (top panel) and within 
nested chunks and at overlap points (bottom panel). 
chunk boundaries are longer than those that remain within chunks, but 
the overlaps among distributions are even more severe than those in Fig. 3. 
This suggests that although IRTs are related to performance from this 
kind of overlapping structure, they are not stable enough to be a 
diagnostic tool. 
The General Applicability of the IR T Partitioning Technique 
The technique of partitioning recall into chunks on the basis of a single 
IRT is based on four assumptions. (1) Elements of patterns are stored 
in memory in chunks, such that each chunk has a label that refers uniquely 
to its constituent elements or subchunks. (2) If the chunks are part of a 
hierarchy, they are strictly nested; no one element or subchunk is a mem- 
ber of more than one chunk at a higher level. (3) All elements of a chunk 
are recalled before all elements of another chunk. And, (4) pauses reflect 
recall of chunks at one consistent level in the hierarchy. 
Because these assumptions are strict, the technique appears to have 
limited applicability in delineating at least the skilled perception of Go 
patterns and potentially more. First, if chunks are hierarchically organ- 
ized and strictly nested, a single IRT chosen to delineate boundaries 
could be expected to reflect recall of elements at one level of the hierarchy 
but neither the constituent subchunks nor its higher order suprachunks. 
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Second, the partitioning of recall on the basis of IRTs requires that all 
elements of a chunk be recalled before all elements of another chunk. 
In a situation in which words were presented in an organized set of non- 
overlapping categories, Gelfand (197 1) found that on only half of the trials 
did subjects show recall that was perfectly categorized. On some trials, 
subjects would recall most of the elements of a category before moving 
on to a new category, then return to a previously entered category to 
attempt completion. On other trials, where there may have been spurious 
cross-category connections, elements of category may have been recalled 
with this cross-category item intruding, the second, already entered cate- 
gory being the next to be recalled. 
Both of these recall patterns may reflect the kinds of overlapping 
clusters the Master Go player indicated in his penciled partitions of Go 
patterns. For example, in Fig. 6B, the Master entered the 3-4-15-12 
chunk on two occasions, at the third and fourth item recalled while he 
was recalling the lower large chunk, and later in completing the upper 
chunk. For patterns with overlapping chunks, it is often impossible to 
recall all elements of a chunk before entering another chunk. 
Third, the Memory and Perception tasks may have induced chunking 
at different levels. In the Perception task, where the subject was free to 
look at the stimulus pattern as often as he liked, he may have encoded 
chunks at the easiest lowest level. However, in the Memory task, when 
given only 5 set of study time on the pattern before being required to re- 
call, he may have opted to encode higher level chunks, looking for far 
reaching relations that allow more complete recall. Some long IRTs re- 
flect lower level chunks, as in the Perception task, whereas other long 
IRTs reflect higher level chunks, as in the Memory task. The kinds of rela- 
tionships among elements within these two levels of chunks could be ex- 
pected to be different, as found in the analysis of chunk contents. 
Finally, the Memory task may have induced the subjects to guess more 
than the Perception task, with the Master’s guessing being more likely 
to be right than the beginner’s. Given some initial stones as clues and 
the knowledge that the pattern came from a Master level game, the Master 
may have been able to figure out the final patterns’ compositions. Some 
of his long IRTs may therefore have reflected not the crossing of chunk 
boundaries but rather problem solving operations that helped him generate 
good guesses. This criticism has been levied against the chess work be- 
fore, and in answer the work of de Groot (1966) is cited. de Groot showed 
that Master chess players are not better than beginners in guessing pat- 
terns when they are given as a clue the squares that the pattern 
occupies. However, the fact that patterns in Go change by growing, rather 
than by displacement as in chess, may account for the emergence of 
guessing in this experiment, especially when the subject is given as clues 
salient pieces (the first ones he sees and remembers) rather than positions 
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occupied. The possibility of differential guessing in these tasks cannot 
be easily dismissed. 
In sum, it appears that both because IRTs can be affected by the level 
within a hierarchy a subject encodes and by subject’s guessing abilities, 
and because perceived patterns may not be strictly nested hierarchies, 
partitioning on the basis of a single IRT is unlikely to produce veridical 
chunks. Before IRTs can be used as behavioral indices of memory struc- 
tures, better delineation is needed of: (1) the set of possible structural 
organizations experts may have, (2) how structures are used in the partic- 
ular task situations, and (3) tasks that minimize intelligent guessing. 
Postscript on a Behavioral Correlate of Structure 
As a postscript to the analysis of behavioral correlates of perceived 
structure, mention should be made of an additional source of systematic 
performance observed in the Memory task. The numbers indicated on the 
stones in the left panel of Fig. 6 indicate the order in which the Master 
placed stones on the board in his final perfect recall of three patterns 
from the Memory task. The order of stone placements seems to follow, 
to a large extent, the organization the Master indicated by pencil 6 months 
after the recall session. Similarly, the right panel of Fig. 6 shows repre- 
sentations of the Master’s recall of stones in his three attempts to re- 
produce a single pattern in the Memory task. Only those stones that were 
recalled on that trial are numbered. Again, it appears that the recall out- 
put orders, though varied, reflect the penciled partitioning. In particular, 
in Fig. 6D, Trial 2, note that stones 8, 9, 10, and 11 are recalled 
contiguously within the indicated chunk, and again in Trial 3 as 7, 9, 8, 
and 10. They are consistently recalled together, without intrusion from 
elements of other chunks, though their internal order varies. Perhaps this 
general correspondence between indicated organization and overall con- 
sistencies in the recall output order suggest a behavioral correlate 
to memory structure more applicable to Go patterns and other non- 
nested hierarchies than IRTs. 
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